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Abstract 
A striking feature of local government reform in many Commonwealth countries has 
been a heavy reliance on structural reform, often in the form of forced local council 
amalgamation. This paper argues that the long-run success of structural change in local 
government hinges on several key factors, not least that voluntary rather than 
compulsory council mergers have a far greater chance of success. A second key 
ingredient resides in a high degree of local autonomy in both the composition and 
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operation of decentralized governmental functions. A third vital factor lies in ensuring 
that revenue and tax assignment is sufficient to provide local government with financial 
autonomy. Finally, adequate powers of taxation need to be accorded to local government 
and this requires careful consideration of the types of taxes most suited to local 
government. 
 
Keywords: Decentralisation, local finance, structural reform, tax assignment 
 
1. Introduction 
The literature on fiscal federalism highlights the various advantages of decentralized 
administrative functions (Oates 1972). Moreover, this body of thought holds that the 
economic approach to multi-tiered government can lead to public policies that may 
improve the economic efficiency of existing systems of government. According to 
conventional economic theory on fiscal federalism, decentralizing the provision of public 
services by local governments can enhance social welfare by better matching citizens’ 
preferences for local service provision. In the public choice approach, the 
decentralization of governmental functions is justified as long as it holds politicians and 
administrators accountable for their actions. Similarly, the benefits of decentralization 
can stem from the comparison of governmental units’ performances and the resulting 
competition between different jurisdictions (Shah 2008). In addition, recent theoretical 
work from a different perspective stresses the value of a federal structure for the 
performance of local economies (Shah 2006). These positive advantages of multi-tiered 
government must be set against coordination problems and potentially irresponsible 
fiscal policies that result from the ‘soft’ budget constraint often facing lower levels of 
government in a multi-tiered structure (Dollery and Robotti 2008). Moreover, there is the 
problem of the optimal size of local governments. Fully exploiting scale and scope 
economies in order to reduce the costs of provision of local public services is not always 
possible. It is thus essential to develop new methods of managing both administrative 
functions and policies for structural reforms. However, in general, it is very difficult to 
close the gap with the fiscal equivalence theorem and this is particularly true in the case 
of multi-task jurisdictions. Therefore, the principle of subsidiarity (which states that the 
management of public responsibilities should be made by institutions closer to citizens) 
ought to be matched with the principle of local capacity (which asserts that local 
governments must have adequate authority, financial resources and administrative and 
technical competence). These issues form the focus of this paper. 
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While at first glance these questions may seem rather too abstract to shed light on the 
difficulties of running real-world local government systems, recent experience in many 
Commonwealth countries indicates their vital practical relevance. For instance, a plethora 
of recent national and state-based inquiries into Australian local government has 
demonstrated conclusively that, without substantial fiscal transfers, additional powers of 
taxation or some other form of revenue augmentation, local councils across Australia 
face financial unsustainability and a growing local infrastructure backlog (Dollery, 
Byrnes and Crase 2007). Similar if lesser concerns have been voiced in New Zealand 
local government and have seen an official Local Government Rates Inquiry (2007) call 
for additional taxes for local councils. In England, the Lyons Inquiry into Local 
Government also carefully considered the adequacy of local government revenue and 
recommended significant reform (Lyons 2007).  
 
The paper is divided into six main parts. Section 2 considers the lessons that can be 
learned from the analysis of alternative models of local government. Section 3 focuses on 
the decentralization of governmental functions, structural reform and the problem of 
revenue assignment. Section 4 deals with the question of tax assignment. Section 5 
considers the question of the most suitable forms of revenue for local government. 
Section 6 considers which taxes are best suited to local government, and the paper ends 
with a brief conclusion in Section 7. 
 
2. Models of local government and the liberty to choose models 
If real-world jurisdictions do not match the economic principles prescribing both 
allocative and economic efficiency, then theorists of ‘functional federalism’ suggest that 
particular public agencies be created for the provision of specific local public services. 
Under these circumstances local government policy should promote the creation of this 
type of public agency. For instance, separate but spatially adjacent local councils may 
create consortia or engender other forms of partnership for the provision of particular 
public services, especially those characterised by scope and scale economies. The 
definition of these independent functional administrations in terms of territorial and 
functional scope would be different from the scope of existing political jurisdictions, 
simply because these new administrative bodies would be designed primarily to seek 
economic advantages (Dollery, Crase and Johnson 2006). Since existing political 
jurisdictions remain in existence, the implicit risk is that this approach could lead to the 
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coexistence of numerous and perhaps excessive overlapping political jurisdictions and 
agencies, each specializing in providing a specific service. This outcome should be 
avoided since the multiplication of single-purpose associations increases transaction 
costs among cooperating governments; furthermore, the heterogeneity amongst the 
partner local councils complicates program coordination and thus increases the 
complexity of the system. Both the economic and political literatures on these questions 
discuss how alternative models of collaboration among local councils in a context of 
multi-task, multi-level government can assist in formulating policies directed at local 
government reform. Observed experience in different countries highlights the widespread 
employment of such models in the real world (Dollery and Robotti 2008). These models 
differ in terms of the level of operational control (the ability to undertake and administer 
local service provision) and political control (the capacity to take decisions over the 
domain and mix of local services) local councils transfer to the new structural entity they 
form. According to the approach devised by Dollery, Crase and Johnson (2006), we can 
locate the different models along a bipolar continuum comprising the degree to which 
political and operational control can be centralized or decentralized between local 
councils and the new organizational entity. Obviously most models of municipal 
government shade into each other but, surely, at one end of the spectrum we can find 
councils which represent fully decentralized political and operational control within the 
confines of their enabling legislation and, at the other end, we will find amalgamated 
councils which concede all political and operational control to the larger new entity to 
which they adhere. From the theoretical point of view, the literature seems to suggest that 
the choice among the different options provided by the respective national legislatures 
depends on the desire for variety in the composition of local government service 
provision (that is, the elasticity of substitution among services), the level of transaction 
costs and the number of councils participating in collaboration. Depending on the nature 
of the services and administrative functions local governments are to undertake, and 
considering the costs and the loss of liberty local communities have to bear, an optimal 
form of agglomeration or cooperation among councils will be selected (Bartolini and 
Fiorillo 2008). 
 
Whatever model is chosen, observed international experience leads to the conclusion that 
local structural reforms work better if inter-municipal cooperation is based largely on 
voluntary participation. For instance, in Australia, New Zealand and Canada, where 
structural reforms were seldom carried out with the voluntary support of local 
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communities, but almost always occurred under various degrees of state coercion, there 
is a growing scepticism over the unsatisfactory economic, political and social outcome of 
council consolidations (Dollery, Garcea and LeSage 2008). Indeed, in some Canadian 
cases public dislike for the imposed arrangements has led to a counter-reform process 
that has nullified most of the effects and consequences achieved by amalgamation, with 
the subsequent loss of credibility by provincial governments. Historical processes loom 
large in the development of many local governments; municipalities often have unique 
ethnic, political and sociological features that typically stretch back over long periods of 
time. Institutional arrangements imposed by central government may thus be doomed to 
failure (Dollery and Robotti 2008). In sum, the first lesson we can derive from this brief 
theoretical and empirical analysis is that compulsory forms of association among 
municipalities appear less effective and less enduring than those based on a voluntary 
agreement. Voluntary participation may be a necessary condition for success. 
 
3. Decentralization of functions, structural reforms and revenue 
assignment 
The second lesson we can draw from theoretical models and international experience 
derives from the financial foundations of local government partnerships. The models 
reported in Dollery and Robotti (2008) demonstrate that associations among local 
councils are enduring and effective if the new administrative entities are financed in a 
stable manner and secure a substantial income from their ‘own’ resources. The proper 
assignment of financial resources is an integral problem connected with decentralization 
of administrative functions and with structural local reforms, which generally accompany 
or follow new assignments of services to municipal governments, and the problem of the 
correct assignment of financial resources is thus fundamental in this context. Indeed, it is 
fruitless to consider transfers of administrative functions from central to lower tiers of 
governments without considering at the same time the financial side of the reform (such 
as which and how many local taxes, which and how many financial transfers from the 
central government, and so on). If we do not simultaneously consider expenditure and 
revenue, then this will lead to erroneous policy prescriptions; if structural reform leads to 
a new and different assignment of functions, then it should be accompanied by a new 
assignment of financial resources. 
 
One must thus pay attention to the implementation of strategies that assign revenue to the 
lower levels of government. In this regard Bahl (1999) offers some rough guidelines: 
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twelve ‘rules’ that might help to form a basis of a decentralization strategy. The first rule 
emphasizes the need for fiscal decentralization to be viewed as a comprehensive system. 
Bahl (1999, p. 4) observed that:  
 
“Intergovernmental fiscal relations must be thought of as a system, and all pieces in 
this system must fit together. Implementation should begin with a design of the 
comprehensive system, and should lay out the plan for each element of the system. A 
‘one-off’ piecemeal reform, encompassing only one element of the system (e.g. central 
government revenue sharing with local governments), is not likely to fully capture the 
benefit of decentralization. In fact, it can lead to undesirable outcomes, including larger 
central deficits and macroeconomic instability. To be sure, a phased-in strategy may be 
the right way to go to avoid ‘reform shock’, but countries should follow a 
comprehensive plan and be prepared to deal with the transition problems during phase-
in.” 
 
Several aspects of the financial structure of sub-national governments are prescribed by 
the theory of fiscal federalism (Oates 1972). The optimal financial structure must 
incorporate the distribution, income and economic activity of the local population. It 
must also take into account the assignment of expenditure functions, the evolution of the 
budgets councils have to manage, and the level of interference of central government in 
the activity of local communities. With regard to the last aspect, when the interference is 
greatest, local authorities must rely mostly on transfers from the centre. In contrast, if 
meddling is limited, sub-national governments ought to finance their budget to a 
significant extent by locally imposed taxes. 
 
Over the past decade, interference in local government by state or provincial 
governments seems to have decreased in most developed countries (Dollery, Crase and 
Johnson 2006). Local governments have been assigned numerous administrative 
functions and have gained major political power and the ability to defend their citizens’ 
interests against the grasp of the centre. Municipalities have often been encouraged to 
merge to enhance economic efficiency and political capability. But if decentralization 
and local political autonomy are to be a reality, it is not sufficient to simply collaborate 
or amalgamate. Whether or not local collaboration occurs, if local governments do not 
want to be under the ‘financial thumb’ of the central government, they need to control 
their ‘own’ sources of revenue and acquire resources adequate to finance the functions 
and expenditures assigned to them. In other words, if local expenditure is expected to 
grow in a substantial manner because of the assignment of additional responsibilities in 
such income-elastic areas as health and education, then the pressure on revenue will be 
great. Local councils must know for certain the resources they need to finance the 
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services they have to provide in the future. Above all they will desire a revenue structure 
that may give them the ability to affect the amount of revenue they receive. A system of 
grants, if defined in an objective way, may be adequate, but a system of taxes 
implemented at local level may ensure financial autonomy and control of both sides of 
the budget. Moreover, a budget financed by ‘own’ taxes stimulates the responsibility of 
local politicians and public managers and may also lead to citizens being able to choose 
the level of expenditure and the quality of services they seek. 
 
Considerations of this kind emphasize the connections that must exist among those being 
taxed with those receiving the benefits. Indeed, it is a longstanding axiom of the theory 
of public finance that a series of incentive problems arise when the political system de-
links taxation and spending, potentially inducing expenditure decisions that deviate from 
allocatively efficient levels.1 
 
4. The problem of tax assignment 
The traditional economic approach to federalism provides insight into the problem of the 
correct assignment of taxation in a multi-level governmental system by prescribing the 
principle of fiscal equivalence. It focuses on the logic of the benefits received by 
constituents and the possibilities of taxation being exported to other jurisdictions. In this 
regard, Oates (1996, p. 36) observed that:  
 
“(1) Lower levels of government…should, as much possible, rely on benefit taxation of 
mobile economic units, including households and mobile factors of production. (2) To 
the extent that non-benefit taxes need to be employed on mobile economic units, 
perhaps for distributive purposes, this should be done at higher level of…government. 
(3) To the extent that local governments make use of non-benefit taxes, they should 
employ them on the tax bases that are relatively immobile across local jurisdictions.” 
 
Other recommendations of the theory of fiscal federalism refer to concerns over 
economic efficiency, political efficiency, administrative costs, accountability, the 
standardization of service provision and horizontal disparities among jurisdictions, 
vertical imbalances between central and local governments, and buoyancy and stability 
of the tax yield (Shah 2008). In short, for the conventional model of tax assignment, 
taxes required for stabilization policy and taxes with a strong redistributive potential 
should both be the responsibility of central governments. In contrast, levies on relatively 
                                                
1
 Wicksell (1896) and Lindhal (1919) developed this rule. Olson (1969) introduced the ‘fiscal equivalence theorem’ and 
Oates (1972) discussed this idea under the heading of ‘perfect correspondence’. Following the work of these theorists, 
deviation from the principle of fiscal correspondence leads to either over or under-provision of local public services.  
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immobile bases, whose base is relatively evenly distributed and whose yields are likely 
to be relatively stable, should fall under sub-national/local governments. In practice the 
best candidates for local taxation are user charges and taxes on real estate. In the case of 
intermediate levels of government, single-stage sales tax and excises are suitable. 
 
These theoretical prescriptions do not usually provide local governments with adequate 
fiscal resources relative to the responsibilities they face, especially where they deliver 
social services. Moreover central governments retain the most lucrative taxes. 
Accordingly, these prescriptions have “one overwhelming practical consequence, 
namely, that almost invariably most, if not all, sub-national governments end up with less 
in ‘own revenues’ ” than the expenditures for which they are responsible (or for which 
they should be responsible, in terms of the now conventional ‘subsidiarity’ approach to 
assigning expenditures)” (Bird 1999, p. 6). It is thus not surprising that the traditional 
fiscal federalism model provides a poor explanation of tax assignment in the real world, 
where the assignment that actually prevails reflects the outcome of political bargaining 
rather than the application of normative economic principles. It is clearly inappropriate 
for countries in which local governments account for an increasingly large proportion of 
public spending with lower levels of central government control. If these local 
governments spend heavily, then they must (in the interests of both economic efficiency 
and accountability) impose greater taxes than the conventional model permits. In this 
regard, Bird (1999 p. 5) has argued that: “it is time to rethink the principles underlying 
the conventional model of tax assignment and to attempt to reconcile principle with 
emerging practice in a more coherent and sustainable way”. These conclusions carry 
even greater weight for amalgamated local councils (or the central government that 
forced the amalgamation), who have to demonstrate to their citizens the validity of the 
merger in terms of significant gains in economic efficiency, independence from central 
and state governments, political power and transparency. 
 
5. Which types of fiscal revenues fit well for local government 
associations? 
The different forms of association2 that local governments can implement meet different 
needs, depending on the type and number of administrative functions that have been 
decentralized. Local councils can engage in weak forms of association, limited forms of 
                                                
2
 In this context ‘association’ refers to mechanisms for cooperation and/or shared service delivery by two or more local 
governments – not to representative associations of councils 
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collaboration, or consortia providing one or more services. Under these circumstances 
municipalities maintain their autonomy and continue to be accountable to their citizens 
for the supply of services even if the provision is delegated to a separate body. In 
contrast, local councils joining strong forms of associations or even amalgamating give 
rise to a new government entity: they give up their autonomy and the new entity is then 
directly accountable to citizens for service provision. Two polar possibilities exist: (1) in 
weak associations of local councils, revenues that finance service provision are retained 
by member local councils, and there is a transfer of resources from the members of the 
association to the association itself in payment for the services supplied; or (2) in 
stronger forms of association, especially in the case of amalgamation, revenues accrue to 
the new merged entity, which is directly accountable for both expenditures and their 
finance. 
 
We will now consider the features of an optimal system of financing the local public 
budget. In the light of options (1) and (2) above, the features we consider desirable will 
refer in certain cases to revenues of weak association members or, alternatively, in the 
event of strong associations, reference will be to revenues of the new governmental 
entity. 
 
A variety of solutions can assign fiscal revenues to lower levels of government. These 
solutions differ in the degree of fiscal autonomy with which they provide local 
governments, their ease of compliance and administration, the fairness and neutrality 
they are likely to produce, the incentives they provide to foster local economic growth, 
and the degree of inter-jurisdictional redistribution they can accommodate. 
 
Before discussing the different fiscal sources to be assigned to strong associations or to 
weak association municipalities, it is useful to set some guidelines for the design of an 
optimal system of revenue. These guidelines must consider at least two features: (1) local 
governments ought to administer their taxes on their own; and (2) local fiscal revenue 
must provide incentives to increase local income and widen the local fiscal base 
(Weingast 2006). However, such guidelines should also consider the nature of the 
financial relations existing between central and local governments. McLure (1999) 
distinguished different cases according to: (1) which level of government chooses the 
taxes from which local governments receive income; (2) which government defines the 
tax bases; (3) which government sets the tax rates; and (4) which government administers 
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the taxes. From the viewpoint of local fiscal sovereignty, the liberty to set rates is clearly 
the most important because this is what allows local authorities to significantly affect at 
the margin the amount of tax yield they collect, and consequently to choose the level and 
quality of public services they provide. We must thus consider among the desirable 
characteristics of a local fiscal revenue system the option for a local government to set its 
own tax rates. 
 
These features are important since they give major revenue independence to local 
governments and moreover enhance the stability of the association pact and the relations 
among the member councils (see Palestrini and Polidori 2008). These simple theoretical 
considerations are useful for choosing between the different methods of assigning fiscal 
revenues to sub-national governments. 
 
With respect to local fiscal revenues it is possible to distinguish four options: 
autonomous local taxes, sub-national surcharges, tax sharing and revenue sharing. In 
general, independent legislation and the administration of own taxes would ensure that 
local councils and/or their associations maximize local fiscal autonomy and generate 
incentives to provide market-enhancing public services and to foster local economic 
growth. Under this system, local governments choose the taxes they impose, define their 
tax bases, set their tax rates, and manage assessment and the collection of taxation 
revenue. The limits of this solution may reside in the excessive complexity of the fiscal 
system, the costs of compliance, or inequities and distortions if jurisdictions choose 
different taxes or administer the same taxes in different ways. But serious problems of 
this type could be avoided, without compromising the autonomy of local governments, 
through agreements among jurisdictions or rules imposed by a higher tier of government.  
Local surcharges represent another potentially optimal solution. Imposing surcharges 
would avoid the inequities, distortions and complexities found in the previous case 
because the definition of the bases and administration of taxes are determined by central 
government, and local governments retain only the power to fix tax rates. As autonomous 
taxes, surcharges reward the administrations that carry policies to increase local income. 
Clearly surcharges must be limited to that portion of the tax base reasonably deemed to 
arise in the taxing jurisdiction. This may be relatively difficult to realize in some cases 
(such as corporate tax) and it may be necessary to adopt formulae to share the tax base 
among affected jurisdictions. Furthermore there is the problem of providing incentives 
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for the central government to administer a tax that it does not simply collect (McLure 
1999). 
 
Tax sharing and revenue sharing are the most common means of providing resources to 
local governments, but from our point of view they are less attractive than the previous 
solutions because they restrict the fiscal autonomy of local jurisdictions; that is, local 
administrations have autonomy over how to spend a given amount of revenue, but not to 
alter the amount of financial resources they receive from the central government. 
Moreover, these types of financial resources provide weak incentives to local 
governments to boost local economic growth. 
 
In short, autonomous taxes and surcharges represent the optimal methods of financing 
local governments. They should be thought of as the optimal means of financing the 
activity of local councils and the associations between them. We thus argue that 
autonomous taxes are best suited to large municipalities, and especially to strong 
associations between them. For small municipalities, where the capacity to administer 
taxes is limited, a system of sub-national surcharges seems more appropriate. 
 
6. Optimal taxes for local governments 
Section 5 suggested that there are arguments for the assignment of ‘own’ taxes to local 
jurisdictions, especially where these are comparatively large. The features of taxes 
usually proposed to finance local governments are sketched below.  
 
User charges  
User charges are suitable for use by all local governments and ought to be employed 
whenever possible. These levies are ‘fair’ in the sense that citizens pay for what they get. 
The problem is that this type of revenue is not usually adequate to finance major 
responsibilities decentralized to local jurisdictions. It also has regressive distributional 
effects. 
Environmental levies 
We include environmental levies among the taxes to be considered at local level. Their 
aim is to compensate for social costs induced by the exploitation of local resources (like 
the degradation of the local environment, costs suffered by the local population, damage 
to local public infrastructure, and so on). In common with user charges they generate 
fairness but, in general, do not provide substantial financial resources to the local budget. 
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Property taxes 
According to the traditional theory of tax assignment, property taxes might be considered 
the most appropriate revenue source for local governments. However these levies 
typically do not provide adequate revenue flows even though they may ensure incentives 
to foster local economic growth, because of the relationship that exists between 
economic development and the value of land, buildings and productive investment 
(Foster et al. 1980).  
 
Personal income taxes  
It is very difficult for local governments to implement and administer resident-based 
income taxes because it requires channelling revenues collected at the origin to the 
jurisdictions where the taxpayers live. This fact requires scrupulous behaviour by 
governments where the income originates (and surely they have few incentives to 
maximize the tax yield on behalf of jurisdictions of residence). However a tax on local 
personal income might be explored (Foster et al. 1980). A suitable solution could be the 
employment of a flat rate tax to pay for the general benefits of public expenditure. 
Benefits in terms of amount of revenue, revenue growth and incentives to increase local 
income are inherent in personal income taxes, but the system is too complex.  
 
Sales taxes 
In most countries the value-added tax (VAT) or consumption tax is the principal general 
sales tax levied by the central government. Whether consumption taxes are suitable for 
use by local governments has long been controversial. In the past, theorists emphasized 
high administrative and compliance costs, and the problems arising from cross-border 
trade, but in reality the problem lay in the reluctance of central governments to lose any 
control over this tax. After the decentralization of major governmental expenditure 
functions in many countries the need of financial revenue outweighed these objections 
and in some countries sales taxes are levied at regional level (as in the United States) or 
at central and regional levels (as in Canada).3 
 
The application of sales taxes at regional level has not been without problems, but where 
the standard of tax administration was sufficiently high it was possible to operate a sales 
tax successfully, at least for large regional governments with close cooperation between 
the different levels of fiscal authorities. The experience of some countries shows that it is 
                                                
3
 For a discussion of several country cases, see Bird (1999) and McLure (1999). 
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perfectly feasible to operate a sales tax at the regional level.4 However it is doubtful 
whether this tax might be employed at a lower level and therefore might finance the 
budget of local council associations.  
 
Taxes on business 
The economic rationale for local business taxation resides in the application of the 
benefit principle: firms should pay for the benefits they receive from local public 
expenditure. Where possible services benefiting specific enterprises should be financed 
by user charges but when this solution is not feasible, some form of broad-based general 
tax on business activities should be levied. 
 
At present the principal forms of business taxation that could be levied at local level are 
threefold: a corporate income tax (CIT), a payroll tax and a turnover tax. All three 
possess problems that make them unattractive as a revenue source, but the financial 
political realities of governing are such that many sub-national governments will wish to 
impose them anyway (Bird 1999). It is generally known that a major disadvantage of a 
local corporation income tax is the difficulty of determining the geographical source of 
profit. Because of the economic interdependence among activities in various 
jurisdictions, it is often impossible to isolate the income source of a company whose 
branches are operating in two or more jurisdictions (McLure 1999). A second well-
known disadvantage is the distortions in the territorial allocation of investment and 
enterprise location that this tax may induce; the levy of the tax by local governments 
without uniformity can trigger forms of destructive ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ competition 
among jurisdictions and cause severe problems to the budgets of municipalities. 
 
Both the turnover tax and the payroll tax present much the same problems. While the tax 
bases for these taxes are easier to determine and to assign than in the case of a local CIT, 
the problem of distortions remains and, in addition, there is the problem of tax exporting. 
Payroll taxes are already utilized in many countries to finance social insurance. 
 
In conclusion, it is difficult to find support for taxing any one input, whether labour or 
capital. Perhaps a broad-based business tax could be levied on the added value 
distributed by enterprises. Such a tax would be neutral to the factor mix and, if nothing 
else, could provide substantial additional revenue to the budget. 
                                                
4
 Clearly a common base would add more efficiency to the system, but this degree of convergence is not essential. 
ROBOTTI & DOLLERY: 
Structural reform, revenue adequacy and  
optimal tax assignment in local government 
 
 
 
 CJLG May 2009 
 
64 
 
The imposition of a business value tax (BTV) has been suggested by Bird (1999). 
Compared with the traditional VAT, the BTV has three important distinguishing 
features: “First, it is levied on income, not consumption: that is, it is imposed on the sum 
of profits and wages, or to put in another way, on investments as well as on consumption. 
Second, it is imposed on production, not consumption: that is, it is imposed on an origin 
not destination basis and hence, in effect, taxes exports and not imports. Third, it is 
assessed by the subtraction (or addition) method on the basis of annual accounts rather 
than on a transaction or invoice-credit method” (Bird 1999, p. 33)5. Moreover “as a 
replacement for existing sub-national business taxes, a BVT would improve sub-national 
tax systems in several ways. First, it would be more neutral and would not favour certain 
investment over others. Second, it would be less susceptible to base erosion especially 
relative to CITs, since, for example, the tax rate would be lower and the base would be 
unaffected by such matters as the extent of debt financing. Third, although more stable 
than CIT in revenue terms, a BVT should nonetheless be more sensitive to cyclical 
realities than most other forms of business tax” (Bird 1999, pp. 33-34). 
 
These arguments are not exclusively theoretical, since variants of such a tax have already 
been implemented in some countries: In Italy, at regional level, IRAP is applied on a 
base including wages, profit and interests. In France the taxe professionelle unique is 
levied by Communes, Régions and Départments and accounts about 20% of local 
revenues. It was originally worded in an analogous manner to BTV, but wages have been 
gradually exempted from the base. In Germany the communal tax Gewerbesteuer at 
present has the nature of a levy on the added value distributed by the enterprise to 
production factors, excluding workers. 
 
Would a local BVT make sense? Following Bird, it might be sensible in large 
jurisdictions, which could reasonably be expected to adequately assess and collect the 
tax, and would have the incentive to do so because of the size of the local base that could 
be tapped. 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
One of the principal themes that flow through the economic literature on structural 
reforms concerns the usefulness of matching the principle of subsidiarity with the 
principle of fitness: the policy of decentralizing major administrative functions to 
                                                
5
 Studenski (1940) proposed a VAT very close to the BVT discussed in this paragraph. 
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municipalities must match with the arrangement of institutional tools that allow local 
communities to exploit in full the potentials placed at their disposal by the central 
government and to serve their citizens in an optimal manner. The experiences of different 
countries show that a set of alternative models of collaboration among local councils is 
available and can help to formulate policies directed at local government reform. Local 
councils have to choose the form of collaboration that fits best with the functions 
transferred to them by the central government. The principle that we have emphasized in 
this respect is ‘voluntariness’: if associations among local councils (either limited or 
extensive) are to be effective and to endure they ought not to be compulsory, but chosen 
by the local councils themselves. 
 
A second principle we draw from theoretical models and international experience focuses 
on the forms of financing local council associations: if local governments have 
significant expenditure responsibilities, they have strong incentives to organize in 
associational arrangements. But if association is to be effective and enduring then the 
new entity must be financed in a stable and predictable manner and should generate a 
substantial proportion of its ‘own’ resources. In this respect, in the final part of this paper 
we sketched the features of taxes that might be proposed to finance the budgets of local 
government associations. 
 
One tax seems to dominate among the different types of financial levies: a new form of 
local business tax called BVT, a tax that might at first be considered as a replacement for 
inefficient and undesirable sub-national CITs. Positive experience in some jurisdictions 
seems to suggest that the path is clear for the application of this tax at local level, at least 
in large jurisdictions, as local government associations should be in ideal circumstances. 
If this view has validity, the present system of local taxation could change in a 
substantial way. The result would be a family of VATs with a standard VAT imposed at 
the central government level, a VAT imposed at regional level and a BVT (essentially an 
income-type VAT) levied on all VAT payees by larger local governments. In addition, 
all sub-national levels of government should apply appropriate user charges, traditional 
property taxes and tax sales. Such a package surely will not solve all the problems of 
establishing sound and workable tax regimes for the associations among local councils, 
but it seems promising and may at least lead to fruitful debate. 
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